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FTCA in a Nutshell
Orville J. Weaver*
T HE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT' is a partial waiver of sovereign
immunity. In Rayonier, Incorporated v. United States,2 the
United States Supreme Court stated: "The purpose of the
Federal Tort Claims Act was to waive the government's tradi-
tional all encompassing immunity from tort action and to estab-
lish novel and unprecedented governmental liability." This legis-
lation does not create a new cause of action, but merely means
that the United States is liable for certain negligent acts in the
same manner as is anyone else.
The Act met with great opposition before it was finally passed
in 1946 by the 79th Congress. It was, however, the result of
widespread feeling that the government should assume the obliga-
tion to pay damages for the misfeasance of its employees in carry-
ing out its work. 8
Prior to the passage of the Act, it was necessary for a claim-
ant to file a bill in Congress for redress in a tort claim against
the government. The Supreme Court, in Dalehite v. United
States,4 said that the private bill had been notoriously clumsy.
In each of the 74th and 75th Congresses, more than 2,300 private
claim bills had been introduced, seeking more than $100,000,000.
In the 76th Congress approximately 2,000 private bills were
introduced, of which 315 were approved for a total of $826,000.
In the 76th Congress, of the 1,829 private claim bills introduced
and referred to the Claims Committee, 593 were approved for a
total of $1,000,253.30. In the 78th Congress, 1,644 bills were intro-
duced and 549 were approved for a total of $1,355,767.12.'
This method was slow as well as clumsy. The private bills
further burdened an already over-burdened legislature. Con-
* Graduate of Rutgers University and a senior at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School; Certified Public Accountant; Special Agent, Intelligence Division,
United States Internal Revenue Service.
The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those
of the United States Treasury Department.
1 28 U. S. C. A. Secs. 2671-2780, 1346(b). See, Wright, Federal Tort Claims
Act Analyzed and Annotated (1957).
2 Rayonier, Inc. v. U. S., 77 S. Ct. 374, 352 U. S. 315 (1957).
3 Dalehite v. U. S., 346 U. S. 15, 73 S. Ct. 956, 97 L. Ed. 1427 (1953).
4 Dalehite v. U. S., Ibid. n. 3.
5 House of Representatives Report No. 1287, 79th Congress, First Session,
page 2.
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gress, in its hearings, recognized the need for such an Act. In
the hearings before the House Judiciary Committee for the 77th
Congress," the following statement was made: "From the Com-
mittee hearings we learn that the previous 85 years had witnessed
a steady encroachment upon the originally unbroken domain of
sovereign immunity from legal process for the delicts of its
agents. Yet a large and highly important area remains in which
no satisfactory remedy has been provided for the wrongs of Gov-
ernment officers or employees, the ordinary 'common law' type of
tort, such as personal injury or property damage caused by the
negligent operation of an automobile."
Exceptions to the Act
The exceptions to the Act, drafted as a clarifying amend-
ment to the House bill, were intended "to assure protection for
the Government against tort liability for errors in administration
or in exercise of discretionary functions." 7 A House of rep-
resentatives Report8 stated: "This is a highly important excep-
tion, intended to preclude any possibility that the bill might be
construed as authorizing suits against the government for dam-
ages growing out of an authorized activity such as irrigation
flood control with no negligence on the part of any government
employee shown, and the only grounds for suit is that the same
act by a private individual would be tortious. It is also intended
to preclude application to claims against regulatory bodies . . .
based upon alleged abuse of discretionary authority, whether or
not negligence is alleged."
Stromswold has stated: 9 "And none could be expected to
foresee at that time the monstrous joker now threatening to en-
gulf the entire Act in a twilight zone-the vague and ambiguous
exceptions from federal liability for 'due care in the execution of
a statute' and 'performance of discretionary function'."
The Supreme Court, in the Dalehite case,' 0 said that, in
interpreting the exceptions to the generality of grant by the Act
6 Hearings before the House Committee of Judiciary, 77th Congress, 2d
Session, on H. R. No. 5373 and H. R. 6463-page 24.
7 Dalehite v. U. S., n. 3, above.
8 House of Representatives Report No. 1287, 79th Congress.
9 Hugh C. Stromswold-"The Twilight Zone of The Federal Tort Claims
Act"-4 Intramural L. R. of Amer. Univ. (2) 41 (1955); and see, Matthews,
F. T. C. A.-Proper Scope of the Discretionary Functions Exception, 6 Amer.
U. L. R. 22 (1957).
10 Dalehite v. U. S., n. 3, above.
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of right to sue the government for negligence of its employees,
courts must include only those circumstances which are within
the words and reason of the exception. In Marbury v. Madison,"
the Supreme Court long ago had said: "Discretion referred to
is not that of the judge, a power to decide within the limits of
positive rules of law subject to judicial review. It is the discre-
tion of the executive or administrator to act according to one's
judgment of the best course, a concept of substantial historical
ancestry in American law."
In the Dalehite case, 12 the Court held that there was no
liability on the Government for an explosion of highly explosive
fertilizer, manufactured by a Government corporation. This was
a discretionary act, and therefore the Court held it to be within
the exceptions. A recent case, Indian Towing Co. v. United
States,l 3 held that the test established by the Tort Claims Act for
determining the United States' liability is whether a private
person would be responsible for similar negligence under the
laws of the State where the acts occurred. The Court further
stated: "We expressly decided.., that the United States' liability
is not restricted to the liability of a municipal corporation or
other public body, and that an injured party cannot be deprived
of his rights under the Act by resort to an alleged distinction,
imported from the laws of municipal corporations, between the
Government's negligence when it acts in a 'proprietary' capacity
and its negligence when it acts in a 'uniquely governmental'
capacity. To the extent that there was anything to the contrary
in the Dalehite case it was necessarily rejected by Indian Tow-
ing." In the Rayonier case, the Government was held liable for
the negligence of its firefighters for losses sustained in a forest
fire. The Court further stated that "there is no justification for
this Court to read exemptions into the Act beyond those pro-
vided by Congress."
In United States v. Yellow Cab Co. and Capital Transit Com-
pany,'4 the Supreme Court held that the Government may be
sued for contribution, and also may be impleaded as a third
party defendant. And, in the same case, stated: "The Federal
Tort Claim Act merely substitutes the District Courts for Con-
"t Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 170, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).
12 Dalehite v. U. S., n. 3, above.
13 Indian Towing Company v. U. S., 350 U. S. 61, 76 S. Ct. 122, 100 L. Ed.
48 (1955).
14 U. S. v. Yellow Cab Co.; Capital Transit Co. v. U. S., 340 U. S. 543, 71
S. Ct. 399, 95 L. Ed. 523 (1951).
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gress as the agency to determine validity and amount of claims
against the Government . . . Authority to sue the sovereign
should be liberally construed."
In the Yellow Cab Company case, the action arose as a re-
sult of a collision between a taxicab and a United States mail
truck. The cab company was sued by its passengers. The cab
company impleaded the United States as a third party defendant
and charged that negligence of the mail truck driver made the
United States liable for all or part of the claims against the cab
company. In the Capital Transit case, a transit car was involved
in a collision with a jeep, driven by a soldier acting within the
scope of his duties. Passengers sued the transit company, which
impleaded the United States as a third party defendant. The
Court held that the Act empowers a United States District Court
to require the United States to be impleaded as a third party
defendant, and to answer the claim of a joint tort-feasor for con-
tribution, as if the United States were a private individual.
In United States v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company15
it was said: "In argument before a number of District Courts and
Courts of Appeal, the Government relied upon the doctrine that
statutes waiving sovereign immunity must be strictly construed.
We think that the Congressional attitude in passing the Tort
Claims Act is more accurately reflected by Judge Cardozo's
statement in Anderson v. John L. Hayes Construction Com-
pany: 16 'The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hard-
ship enough, where consent has been withheld. We are not to add
to the rigor by refinement or construction, where consent has
been announced.' . . ."
Brooks v. United States7 held that the Federal Tort Claims
Act, giving District Courts jurisdiction over "any claim" against
the United States founded on negligence, includes claims for
injury or death of members of armed forces not incident to
military service, in view of the language, framework and legis-
lative history of the Act. On the other hand, a Circuit Court held
the Government to be liable in a case where a sailor, traveling
under Government orders, while running to catch a slow moving
train bumped an elderly woman, causing her to sustain serious
15 U. S. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 338 U. S. 366, 70 S. Ct. 207, 94
L. Ed. 171 (1949).
16 Anderson v. John L. Hayes Construction Co., 243 N. Y. 140, 153 N. E. 28
(1926).
17 Brooks v. U. S., 33 U. S. 49, 69 S. Ct. 918, 93 L. Ed. 1200 (1949).
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injuries. The Court held that the sailor was acting in line of duty
at the time of the accident.' 8
Procedure
The FTCA authorizes the head of each federal agency, or his
designee for the purpose, acting on behalf of the United States,
to consider, ascertain, adjust, determine, and settle any claim for
money damages of $1,000 or less against the United States, ac-
cruing for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death,
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any em-
ployee of the Government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment, under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.19 This section further states that the acceptance by the
claimant shall be final and conclusive on the claimant, and shall
constitute a complete release of any claim against the United
States and against the employee of the government whose act or
omission gave rise to the claim, by reason of the same subject
matter.
Section 2674 states that the Government shall not be liable
for interest prior to the judgment, nor for punitive damages.
Claims in excess of $1,000 must be forwarded to Congress after
a determination is made either by settlement or trial.
During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1955, 977 actions were
commenced in the District Courts,20 and in the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1956, 934 tort actions were commenced. 2 1 These actions
were disposed of as follows:
Dismissed for Consent Judgment
want of Default Before During or
prosecution Judgment Trial After Trial
1955 17 1 95 6
1956 29 1 121 8
Consent Dismissal
Before During or Other
Trial After Trial Transfers Dispositions
1955 432 11 12 96
1956 411 17 8 34
18 Campbell v. U. S., 75 F. Supp. 181 (D. C. La. 1948), cert. den. 337 U. S.
957, 69 S. Ct. 1532, 93 L. Ed. 1757 (1948).
19 28 U. S. C. A. Sec. 2672.
20 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, Table C4 (1955).
21 Ibid., n. 21, Report for the year 1956, Table C4.
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Contested Judgment Judgment by
Judgment by Judgment Court During
Decision of After Jury Trial
Court Before Non-Jury Directed
Trial Trial Verdict Other
1955 49 247 1 -0-





If the claim against the Government is not settled with the
agency against which it was made, or if the amount of the claim
exceeds $1,000, the action may then be brought in the United
States district court. Title 28, United States Code Section 2402
provides that a jury trial is denied in actions against the United
States. This provision in the Act might in some cases result in
smaller awards than those granted by juries. Counsel for the
claimant has the burden, in this type of case, to aid the Court
in making findings of fact. Obviously, in a trial to the court
without a jury, the attorney usually must depend upon facts
and law, rather than upon appeals to the sympathies of jurors.
Of interest to the attorney is the matter of fees allowed
under the Act. As stated below, the attorney is limited to 20
per centum of the amount recovered, and this amount is to be
paid out of the amount recovered, and not in addition to the
amount recovered. Title 28 U. S. C. Section 2678 provides that
any attorney who charges, demands, receives or collects for
services rendered in connection with a claim under the Act, any
amount in excess of that allowed under this section, shall be
fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both. This provision may limit the attorney to a fee
which is considerably less than that to which he would be en-
titled in a tort action in a state court. He therefore must risk
his time and efforts for a possible fee which is less than that to
which he may be accustomed. The attorney nevertheless is still
obliged to make a thorough investigation of the facts, as in any
case. The Government has on its side the various official in-
vestigative organizations and agencies. For instance, the Treas-
ury Department's investigators investigate all of the circum-
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol7/iss1/11
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stances of any accident involving tort claims against that Depart-
ment. These investigators are thorough, and it is probable that
any person who has any knowledge of the event will have been
questioned long before the attorney is retained. The govern-
ment's agents thus can have all of the facts advantageously
available for the government attorney who will try the case.
This points up the fact that the attorney who takes a case against
the government under the FTCA often is gambling against heavy
odds. If his client cannot afford the expense of the investigation,
the attorney himself must be ready and able to meet that ex-
pense. Such investigations are expensive, particularly when the
attorney may be taking a chance that he may never recover.
If the attorney is successful in prosecuting his client's claim,
and the court awards a sum of money to the client, there is still
the possibility of an expensive appeal. The Government's staff
attorneys prepare the case for appeal to the Court of Appeals as
a routine part of their job. But what about the plaintiff's attor-
ney? The appeal may be so costly as to make his fee inadequate.
The Government can also appeal the cases to the Supreme Court
-indeed a costly appeal for the claimant.
Key Sections of the Act
The F. T. C. A. sections of greatest importance provide as
follows (in outline and with notes from leading cases interpret-
ing the sections):
Section 1346 is the first section which deals with torts. This
section defines the United States as a defendant. Part (b) states:
District courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions
on claims against the United States for money damages, accruing
on or after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or
personal injury, or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act
or omission of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances
where the United States would be liable to the claimant in ac-
cordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred."
Prior to enactment of former Section 931 of this title, the
United States could not be sued on a tort claim, whether by
original suit or counterclaim, in absence of specific congressional
authority authorizing such suit.
22
22 U. S. v. Dugan, 36 F. Supp. 109 (E. D. N. Y., 1941).
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Damages in tort were not allowed in an action against the
United States caused by overflow of a river because of con-
struction of a dam.
23
In light of unmistakable language of report of House Judi-
ciary Committee about jurisdiction under F. T. C. A. and in light
of judicial construction of former Section. 41 (20), suits under
F. T. C. A. are subject to the same rigid rule of construction in
favor of government as any other waiver statute.24
The purpose of former Section 931 of this title was to relieve
Congress of burden of determining merits of tort claims against
the United States.2 5
Section 1402(b) states that any action on a tort claim may
be prosecuted only in the judicial district where the plaintiff
resides or wherein the act or omission complained of occurred.
Section 1504 sets forth that the Court of Claims shall have
jurisdiction to review by appeal final judgments in the District
Courts in civil actions based on tort claims brought under Sec-
tion 1346 (b) of this title, if the notice of appeal filed in the Dis-
trict Court has affixed thereto the written consent on behalf of
all the appellees that the appeal be taken to the Court of Claims.
Section 2110 provides that the appeal to the Court of Claims
in tort claims cases shall be taken within 90 days after the final
judgment of the District Court.
Section 2401(b) states that a tort claim against the United
States shall be forever barred unless action is begun within two
years after such claim accrues or unless, if it is a claim not ex-
ceeding $1,000, it is presented in writing to the appropriate
agency within two years after such claim accrues. If a claim not
exceeding $1,000 has been presented in writing to the appropriate
agency within that period of time, suit thereon shall not be
barred until the expiration of a period of six months after either
the withdrawal of such claim from the agency or the date of mail-
ing notice by the agency of final disposition of the claim.
Subsection (b) of this section, providing that a tort claim
against the United States shall be forever barred unless action
is begun within two years after the claim accrues, limits the
substantive rights created by F. T. C. A. Sections 1346 and 2671-
268 of Title 28, and is not merely a procedural requirement.2 6
23 Christman v. U. S., 74 F. 2d 112 (7th Cir., 1934).
24 Uarte v. U. S., 7 F. R. D. 705 (S. D. Cal., 1948).
25 Van Wie v. U. S., 77 F. Supp. 22 (N. D. Iowa, 1948).
26 Foote v. Public Housing Comm., 107 F. Supp. 270 (W. D. Mich., 1952).
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Section 2402. Jury trial: Any action against the United
States under Section 1346 shall be tried by the court without
a jury.
Section 2411(b) states: "Except as otherwise provided in
subsection (a) of this section, on all final judgments rendered
against the United States in actions instituted under section 1346
of this title, interest shall be computed at the rate of 4 per centum
per annum from the date of the judgment up to, but not exceed-
ing, thirty days after the approval of any appropriation Act pro-
vided for payment of the judgment." In this connection, it should
be noted that claims over $1,000 must be transmitted to Congress
after a determination has been made, either by settlement or by
trial. The Congress is presented with these claims by "Proposed
Supplemental Appropriations To Pay Claims For Damages,
Audited Claims, And Judgments Rendered Against The United
States." Publication of these claims is made in House and Senate
Documents.
Section 2412 treats of "Costs." Subsection (b) provides: "In
an action under subsection (a) of section 1346 or section 1491 of
this title, if the United States puts in issue plaintiff's right to re-
cover, the district court or Court of Claims may allow costs to the
prevailing party from the time of joining such issue. Such costs
shall include only those actually incurred for witnesses and fees
paid to the clerk." Subsection (c) states: "In an action under
subsection (b) of section 1346 of this title, costs shall be allowed
in all courts to the successful claimant, but such costs shall not
include attorneys' fees."
Costs could not be assessed against the United States in the
absence of a statute directly and specifically so authorizing. 27
Costs on appeal to the Supreme Court, in a case in which
the United States was a party, should not have on reversal been
granted to the United States because of former Supreme Court
Rule 29 giving costs to the prevailing party, since it did not apply
where the United States was a party.2
Chapter 171 sets forth procedural rules (see Procedure,
above.)
Section 2671 defines the term "federal agency" as includ-
ing the executive departments and independent establishments
27 U. S. v. Knowles' Estate, 58 F. 2d 718 (9th Cir., 1932).
2 8 Oregon & C. R. Co. v. U. S., 37 S. Ct. 443, 243 U. S. 549, 61 L. Ed. 890
(1917).
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of the United States, and corporations primarily acting as in-
strumentalities or agencies of the United States; but does not
include any contractor with the United States. And "employees
of the government" includes officers or employees of any federal
agency, members of the military or naval forces of the United
States, and persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an
official capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service of
the United States, whether with or without compensation. "Act-
ing within the scope of his office or employment," in the case of a
member of the military or naval forces of the United States,
means acting in "line of duty."
This section, defining the term "federal agency" as including
executive departments and independent establishments of the
United States and Government corporations, defines the term
only in connection with Section 2674 of this title relating to ad-
ministrative adjustments of certain claims, and does not apply
to Section 2674 of this title so as to extend liability of the United
States in respect to tort claims. 29
Section 2672 is titled "Administrative adjustment of claims
of $1,000 or less." This section provides that the head of each
agency may consider, ascertain, adjust, determine, and settle any
claim for money damages of $1,000 or less. Such settlement shall
be final and conclusive on the claimant, and shall constitute a com-
plete release of any claim against the United States and against
the employee of the Government whose act or omission gave rise
to the claim, by reason of the same subject matter.
Section 2674 defines the liability of the United States re-
lating to tort claims, and provides that the Government shall not
be liable for interest prior to the judgment, nor for punitive
damages. Where the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred provides for damages only punitive in nature, the
United States shall be liable for actual or compensatory dam-
ages, measured by the pecuniary injuries resulting from such
injury or death to the persons, respectively, for whose benefit
the action was brought.
Section 2675(a): "An action shall not be instituted upon a
claim against the United States which has been presented to a
federal agency, for money damages for injury or loss of property
or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of an employee of the government while acting
29 Douffas v. Johnson, 83 F. Supp. 644 (D. C. D. C., 1949).
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within the scope of his authority, unless such federal agency has
made final disposition of the claim." However, Subsection (b)
provides that the claimant may, upon fifteen days written notice,
withdraw such claim from consideration of the federal agency
and commence action thereon. And, action under Section 2675
shall not be instituted for any sum in excess of the amount of
the claim presented to the federal agency, except where the in-
creased amount is based upon newly discovered evidence not
reasonably discoverable at the time of presenting the claim to the
federal agency, or upon allegation and proof of intervening facts,
relating to the amount of the claim.
Section 2676 provides that the judgment in an action under
Section 1346 (b) shall constitute a complete bar to any action by
the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against the
employee of the Government whose act or omission gave rise
to the claim.
These sections must be strictly construed, since claims pre-
sented to a federal agency rely on a limited waiver of sovereign
immunity. No power is given to claimants to alter rights there-
under.30
Section 2678: Reasonable attorney fees may be allowed by
the court or agency. If the recovery is $500 or more, the fee
shall not exceed 10 per centum of the amount recovered un-
der section 2672, or 20 per centum of the amount recovered un-
der section 1346 (b), to be paid out of, but not in addition to the
amount of judgment, award, or settlement recovered. However,
any attorney who charges, demands, receives, or collects for
services rendered in connection with such claim any amount in
excess of that allowed under section 2678, shall be fined not more
than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
Less than 20% was held to be a reasonable sum to be allowed
plaintiff's attorneys. 3'
Section 2680 defines the exceptions to which the provisions
of Chapter 171 and section 1346 (b) shall not apply. Subsection
(a) of this section states: "Any claim based upon an act or omis-
sion of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in
30 Carlson v. U. S., 88 F. Supp. 337 (N. D. Ill., 1949); Satterwhite v. Bocela-
to, 130 F. Supp. 825 (E. D. N. C., 1955); Gitman v. U. S., 206 F. 2d 846 (9th
Cir., 1953), affd., 347 U. S. 507, 74 S. Ct. 695, 98 L. Ed. 898 (1953).
31 Hampton v. U. S., 121 F. Supp. 303 (D. C. Nev., 1954); Cotant v. U. S.,
103 F. Supp. 770 (D. C. Idaho, 1952); Hodges v. U. S., 98 F. Supp. 281
(S. D. Iowa, 1948); Bandy v. U. S., 92 F. Supp. 360 (D. C. Nev., 1950).
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the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such
statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or per-
formance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee
of the Government, whether or not the discretion be abused."
This subsection is the one upon which the courts have held the
Government not to be liable in a number of cases.32
The other twelve subsections define the other exceptions to
the Act. These other exceptions are rather specifically spelled
out, so that there need be little, if any, interpretation or con-
struction. It is the "discretionary" acts which have caused the
trouble in the interpretation of the Act.
32 Dalehite case, n. 3, above; Feres v. U. S., 340 U. S. 135, 71 S. Ct. 153, 95
L. Ed. 152 (1950).
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